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abstract
In this paper, I will try to give an overview of my
main arguments for global social protection, and
at the same time relate those arguments to
some important events in my personal life. This
is not what academics are expected to do, but
this is not a purely academic publication.
My first argument is purely humanitarian – it is
about saving lives. In 2000, in Mozambique, the
Médecins Sans Frontières team I was leading
and the Ministry of Health (MoH) were not able
to save the lives of children with AIDS, because
of an ideological belief: the belief that open-
ended solidarity across borders – comparable to
the open-ended solidarity we practice within
countries – is wrong, that states must be or be-
come financially autonomous, and that health-
promoting efforts should therefore not cost more
than what a country can afford without becoming
dependent on assistance. This belief still kills
millions of people every year. If global social pro-
tection for health, based on redistribution of in-
come that is as reliable as it is within countries,
would replace ‘development assistance’ as we
know it, those lives could be saved.
My second argument is about human rights,
about the right to health in particular. The inter-
national treaties may not as clear as they should
be, and they may focus too much on national re-
sponsibility, which results in the right to health
being quite different depending on the country
one lives in. But they also conform that health is
a human right; that every human being should
have access to water, food, and essential health
care; and that this a responsibility of humanity
towards humanity. If access to water, food, and
essential health care were not a responsibility of
humanity towards humanity, health would not be
a human right, but a privilege, for people born in
the ‘right’ countries. This became the core argu-
ment of my doctoral thesis.
My next argument is about justice – it is not fun-
damentally different from the argument about
the right to health, and therefore it only counts
as half. Having appointed me as a ‘Global Jus-
tice Fellow’ at Yale, Thomas Pogge challenged
me to explore why health is a human right,
regardless to the treaties, as a matter of justice.
My first answer is that human rights are transla-
tions of a pre-historical natural sense of justice,
which demanded that members of a tribe acted
as partners worthy of cooperation, and allowed
each other to be partners – ‘to allow’ understood
passively, but also actively, as in providing an
allowance. Supporting each other in being or
becoming healthy is an essential part of that,
and it cannot be confined within country borders.
My second answer is that within a free market
mechanism, people may harm each other wit-
hout knowing it, and without intention, because
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of ‘bad inequality’: the kind of inequality that al-
lows the privileged to preserve their privileged
positions. Social protection is a correction to
that – a kind of insurance against unintended
harm doing. As bad inequality works beyond
borders, social protection should correct beyond
borders too.
My third argument is about enlightened self-in-
terest, from the perspective of the inhabitant of
a high-income country. While I was looking for
illustrations of increasing inequality between
countries, what I found was increasing inequality
within countries. Bad inequality is still working,
not as much between countries – making rich
countries richer and poor countries poorer – as
it used to be, more between clans of people. The
correction (social protection) is being eroded,
because it is organised per country, and govern-
ments are obliged to adjust to the lower taxation
and social protection standards of their neigh-
bours. Social protection is succumbing to a kind
of ‘tragedy of the commons’; it will take coope-
ration and harmonisation between countries to
protect it within countries.
FIG. 1: MULTI-LAYERED GLOBAL SOCIAL
PROTECTION
© Gorik Ooms & San-Ho Correwyn
Conclusion: global social protection is the logical
next step in the geographical expansion of mu-
tual support systems – from tribes to cities, and
from cities to countries, and from countries to the
planet. From Doctors Without Borders to Social
Protection Beyond Borders requires only an in-
cremental change.
introduction
The first time I heard about the idea of global so-
cial protection was in a rather dramatic brains-
torming session about AIDS treatment in Mo-
zambique in 2000. (Many years later, I found out
that Abram de Swaan (1994) had suggested it
even earlier.) It was the medical coordinator of
our Doctors Without Borders or Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) team, Piet Corijn, who came
up with it. The idea has never left my mind since
then; gradually it became the essence of my
work.
Over the years, my reasons for promoting global
social protection have evolved, expanded and
matured. Most of them have been published, but
not in a coherent way. This reader gives me an
opportunity to briefly describe three and a half
arguments, with references to the papers where
they are published in greater detail.
To be clear, our proposal is not to create a global
social protection scheme that would replace na-
tional schemes, only to add a layer. Social pro-
tection schemes are not monolithic blocs. For
example, the average inhabitant of a member
state of the European Union pays taxes and par-
ticipates in social protection at the level of the
city he or she lives in. In many European Union
member states, there are taxes at sub-national
levels (‘communities’ or ‘regions’ in Belgium;
‘Länder’ in Germany). The largest amount of tax
is levied at the national level. Finally, all member
states of the European Union contribute financi-
ally to the running of the European Union, which
now contains some mutual social protection, al-
beit very modest (cf Holst: Implementing the So-
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lidarity Principle through Financial Equalisation
in this reader: 86-104). Within the United States
of America, the situation is similar. Most people
pay taxes at the municipal level, i. e. to the city
in which they live, at county level, at the state
level (e.g. as income tax or sales tax) and then
at the federal level. The idea is not to replace all
of that with a single global scheme but to add a
relatively modest global layer, as the illustration
expresses.
First argument: global social protection for
health is a humanitarian duty
If there is a single moment that defined the rest
of my life, it would be the moment when I was
told that out of about 40 children we – the MSF
team, supporting the MoH – were treating for
malnutrition in Chokwe, Mozambique, one did
not have AIDS. The town of Chokwe had been
flooded in February 2000. People lost their
homes, harvests and reserves, and relied on
food distributions. These food distributions are
never perfect; there always is a group of house-
holds that will be excluded because they are not
duly registered, for example. And some of these
excluded households will wait until one or more
of their children are extremely malnourished be-
fore seeking medical assistance. That is why
setting up a therapeutic feeding centre is one of
the standard responses after disasters like
floods. The children receive the specialised and
fortified milk or dairy products they need, and the
families are included in food distributions.
It also is one of the most rewarding interventi-
ons: a series of Lazarus-like ‘miracles’ can be
expected. When the children arrive they are
weak and silent, as if they are just waiting to die.
A few weeks later, they can leave, smiling,
cheerful and making all sorts of noise. And we
had our series of ‘miracles’ in Chokwe. But not
enough. Some children did not get better. They
remained weak and silent, they had diarrhoea,
and too many died. After a month or three, we
should have been able to close the centre: the
households that had been excluded from the
food distribution schemes should have been in-
cluded by then, and the severely malnourished
children should have recuperated. It did not
make any sense. Then someone suggested that
many of these children probably had AIDS, and
that they were not malnourished because of the
floods and the destroyed harvest, but because
they had chronic diarrhoea – no matter how
much they ate or drank, they would not recupe-
rate.
Bringing up the hypothesis created a dilemma
in itself. We had already discussed with the MoH
the possibility of providing antiretroviral treat-
ment and the answer was negative. The MoH
did not want a foreign organisation to introduce
a level of health care that it would not be able to
continue or replicate, and in May 2000, we were
still talking about a cost of US$2,000 per person
per year. (None of the antiretroviral medicines
we needed were patent-protected in Mozam-
bique, but even the generic versions were ex-
pensive; the offer from CIPLA – an Indian manu-
facturer of generic medicines – of a ‘cocktail’ at
US$1 per day came a year later.) And several
‘donors’ – I’ll explain later why they are not really
donors – had made it clear they would not sup-
port AIDS treatment. If we tested children and
they turned out to be HIV positive, we had not-
hing to offer them except some palliative care,
so why would we test them at all? To satisfy our
curiosity? But if they really had AIDS, they would
have gotten it from their mothers – who could
have been HIV positive without having develo-
ped full-blown AIDS yet – and some of their sib-
lings would probably be HIV positive too. In that
case, keeping the children and their mothers in
a feeding centre seemed a cruel thing to do.
Eventually, we agreed with the MoH to do ‘ano-
nymous and unlinked’ tests, meaning that blood
samples were taken without any code that could
link them to the individual children they were
taken from, so we would know how many chil-
dren were HIV positive, but we would not know
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which children were and which ones were not.
(Anonymous and unlinked testing was pretty un-
controversial at that time; that is no longer the
case, and for good reasons (Rennie et al.
2009).)
I was in the feeding centre when the results
came back: only one of the children was not HIV
positive. It was worse than expected, and we
had already decided beforehand – after heated
discussions – what our reaction would be: to
send all children home to die as peacefully as
possible. That was not a consensual decision;
some of our team members wanted to keep the
children there, and start making a video docu-
mentary with the title ‘World, Watch Them Die’,
or something similar. The whole situation was
absurd: a few months earlier, ‘donor’ represen-
tatives had been willing to hire helicopters for
rescue operations at ridiculously expensive pri-
ces – US$ 2,000 per hour or more. (If my me-
mory is correct, one of our helicopters had come
all the way from Bulgaria, because that was
cheaper.) The very same people who had been
willing to pay for that were now refusing to fi-
nance treatment at US$ 2,000 per year, for the
very same children they had saved at US$ 2,000
per hour. I made a few phone calls to the MoH
and to some of these ‘donor’ representatives,
but they had not changed their minds. And then
I watched mothers gathering their stuff, picking
up their children, and going home silently – ac-
cepting their horrible fate.
It was not the first time I was confronted with this
apparent contradiction between the ‘exube-
rance’ of relief and the stinginess of develop-
ment assistance, provided by the same institu-
tions. It is all about sustainability. If you want in-
terventions to be sustainable, the countries
where you want to have these interventions
should be able to continue them with their own
funding, at least in the long run – or so the the-
ory goes. So you should not provide AIDS treat-
ment in a country that has no real perspective
of becoming wealthy enough, fast enough, to
take over the financing. In a crisis situation, ho-
wever, you can ignore sustainability, because
the crisis is temporary by definition. It does not
matter that the Government of Mozambique
cannot afford helicopters for rescue operations,
because we are assuming – wrongly, in all pro-
bability – that the floods will not return. It is not
an entirely senseless theory. If we want to avoid
some countries becoming dependent on others,
international assistance should be limited, in vo-
lume or in time. 
That is the pleasant narrative about the contra-
diction between emergency relief and develop-
ment assistance: the international community is
aiming for countries’ autonomy, or emancipation.
It is supported by many people and organizati-
ons; even people who strongly support increa-
sing taxation as a matter of solidarity (between
people within the same country) seem to object
to long-term reliance on solidarity across natio-
nal borders. For example, a senior political ad-
visor at Christian Aid recently argued that the UK
development secretary “must uphold UK aid
spending while devising an exit strategy” and
encourage developing countries to increase tax
revenue to make aid redundant (Oyuela 2012).
The less pleasant narrative is that international
assistance is essentially charity, given by people
and their representatives who feel that they do
not ‘owe’ assistance to others who live in diffe-
rent countries. They are generous, but feel they
should be allowed to end their generosity at any
time.
In 2006, I wrote an article about this contra-
diction between emergency relief and develop-
ment assistance (Ooms 2006). In Mozambique,
in 2000, our pressing concern was not to exa-
mine or expose the contradiction, but to over-
come it. Those were the circumstances in which
our medical coordinator compared international
assistance at the beginning of the 21st century
with national assistance at the end of the 19th
century: charitable, and therefore unreliable, and
therefore not quite as useful as the same
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amount of money could be, if given out of soli-
darity. And therefore, he argued, we should ad-
vocate in favour of global social protection.
We did not, I must admit; MSF did not take up
advocacy for global social protection. We took
the path we knew best; we called the epidemic
of AIDS a global emergency and a humanitarian
crisis, we called for relief, not for a better version
of development assistance. It was a humanita-
rian crisis, we argued, and we got relief: for
example, PEPFAR – the USA President’s Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief that was launched by
the end of 2002 – had both ‘emergency’ and ‘re-
lief’ in its name. And we should not be ashamed
of millions of people living many years longer
because of a massive and unprecedented relief
response; this also means millions of children
becoming orphans at an older age. But in hind-
sight, we could have ‘used’ the AIDS epidemic
to illustrate the failure of development assis-
tance and to call for a better version of it; one
based on solidarity, not charity. Perhaps it is not
too late.
To be sure, calling for global social protection
instead of development assistance, as we know
it is not essentially about the volume of transfers
– although the volume of transfers would defini-
tely increase if development assistance became
global social protection. It is essentially about
accepting that people owe support to each
other, within countries and beyond the borders
of countries, as a matter of solidarity, not charity.
And this is not a semantic discussion: assis-
tance that is reliable in the long run can do
things that unreliable assistance cannot do. For
example, if you are an MoH staff member of a
low-income country and you receive a grant of
US$ 50,000, you could buy an ambulance or
you could hire 50 nurses for a year. If you know
the grant will be continued year after year, you
will do better to hire 50 nurses, as they will save
a lot more lives than an ambulance. But if you
think the grant will not be repeated, you had bet-
ter buy the ambulance, as it will not protest if it
is ‘fired’ next year. As explained in a shorter
technical paper for this reader, unreliability of in-
ternational assistance in the long run is probably
the most underestimated problem of internatio-
nal assistance (cf. Ooms: Fiscal Space and the
Importance of Long Term Reliability of Interna-
tional Co-financing in this reader: 135-139).
second argument: global social protection for
health is required to realise the human right to
health
In 2001, the attitude of the international commu-
nity towards the epidemic of HIV/AIDS changed
quite dramatically. The most notorious manifes-
tation of this change was the ‘Special Session
on HIV/AIDS’ of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, better known as UNGASS (Uni-
ted Nations General Assembly Special Session),
which ushered in the so-called ‘Declaration of
Commitment’ (United Nations General Assembly
2001). It called the HIV/AIDS epidemic “a global
emergency”, and will be remembered for crea-
ting what became the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria – or, as worded in the
Declaration, for supporting “the establishment,
on an urgent basis, of a global HIV/AIDS and
health fund to finance an urgent and expanded
response to the epidemic based on an integra-
ted approach to prevention, care, support and
treatment.” This was approved by the very same
governments whose representatives had deci-
ded – 12 months earlier – to refuse treatment to
the children with AIDS in Chokwe.
What had happened? In Mozambique, we were
so happy about having a prospect of providing
AIDS treatment that the question about the U-
turn did not really matter. As the whole Declara-
tion was engendering a sense of emergency, I
could not help being worried, as I knew from ex-
perience that the international community’s at-
tention for emergencies can be as intense as it
is short-lived. What if, after a couple of years,
the international community once again felt the
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same way as it did 12 months before the Decla-
ration? Would we stop treating people? Even
then, our medical team members argued, a few
years of treatment is better than no treatment at
all.
Furthermore, AIDS was not our only concern. In
the north of the country we were running a pro-
ject that provided training to traditional birth at-
tendants; the results were disappointing and
many of our team felt that we should focus on
hospital-based emergency obstetric care, which
required ambulances and a communication sys-
tem between health centres. This was expen-
sive – indeed, it was considered too expensive
for Mozambique – but not quite as expensive as
AIDS treatment. And there was a general pro-
blem with user fees to be paid by people nee-
ding healthcare; we knew that they excluded
many people. It was unimaginable that people
would be asked to pay for AIDS treatment –
even if the fees were only a fraction of the real
cost, it would cause people to discontinue their
treatment as soon as they felt better. In a nuts-
hell, it did not seem fair that caesarean sections
would not become available in places where
AIDS treatment was, or that people would have
to pay for malaria treatment but not for AIDS
treatment. 
The Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS
not only referred to the ‘global emergency’ but
also contained several references to human
rights, and the right to health in particular. For
example, it mentioned that “access to medica-
tion in the context of pandemics such as HIV/
AIDS is one of the fundamental elements to
achieve progressively the full realisation of the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental
health.” But surely, that was equally valid for
other essential medicines as for emergency obs-
tetric care. If taken seriously, it also required en-
suring that nobody would be excluded from
healthcare merely because they were unable to
pay the user fees.
This reference to the right to health seemed pro-
mising, as it could provide a basis for reliable in-
ternational assistance: not temporarily, as long
as richer countries’ governments felt like it, but
for as long as was necessary to realise the right
to health. And it would apply to health in general,
not to AIDS only. But there was something disin-
genuous about this statement, or so I felt. From
my university days – I am a lawyer – I remem-
bered that human rights define minimum levels
of acceptable relationships between govern-
ments and the people under their jurisdiction;
human rights are about what your government
cannot do to you, or what it must do for you.
They are not about what governments cannot do
or should do for people living elsewhere, or so I
remembered. And therefore it did not solve our
problems in Mozambique, as it was too poor –
and no person (or institution or government) can
be obliged to do something it is unable to do. 
So your human rights entitlements depend on
what your government is able to do: if you hap-
pen to live in a wealthy country, your human
rights entitlements are larger than they would be
if you would live in a poorer country. That is what
the reference to “achieve progressively the full
realisation” in the Declaration of Commitment
means. Surely, if you need AIDS treatment, it is
an essential element of your right to health –
your right to the enjoyment of the highest attai-
nable standard of physical and mental health, as
the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights defined it. But only if your
government can afford it …
When I was reading the Declaration of Commit-
ment for the first time, I remember how I had dis-
liked – as a student – this concept of progressive
realization. If human rights are truly human
rights, rights one has because of being a human
being, they should not depend on the wealth of
the country one lives in. Imagine that slavery
would be illegal only in countries where the cir-
cumstances permitted the abolition of slavery.
But if that is what the international treaties pres-
36 Global social protection scheme – moVinG From charity to solidarity
cribe, a United Nations’ declaration should not
suggest otherwise – or it should improve the
treaties.
So I decided to refresh my memory. I vaguely
remembered that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to
international assistance as a means to hasten
the progressive realisation, and I easily found it,
in article 2(1) of the Covenant: “Each State Party
to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international as-
sistance and co-operation, especially economic
and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressi-
vely the full realisation of the rights recognised
in the present Covenant.” (United Nations Com-
missioner on Human Rights 1966). But it was
easier to find than to understand. Does it mean
that states have obligations to realise these
rights for ‘their’ people, and to seek international
assistance if they need it? Or does it mean that
states have an obligation to realise these rights
for all people, directly for their own inhabitants,
and through international assistance for every-
one else? If the latter interpretation was the cor-
rect one, then on what grounds would govern-
ments prioritise their inhabitants? Or shouldn’t
they; should they support the rights of all people
equally? That latter – very egalitarian – interpre-
tation was attractive, but not quite realistic; I
could not imagine the people of Belgium – the
country I am from – agreeing to share all their
tax contributions with the entire world.
I then looked up the most recent ‘concluding ob-
servations’ about Belgium. For the readers who
are not familiar with the role of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that
committee was created to monitor how states
that have ratified the International Covenant are
progressing (or not). These states write periodic
reports and the Committee makes observations
about the reports. The most recent I could find
in 2001 were the concluding observations from
November 2000, in which the Committee “notes
with concern that, in 1998, Belgium devoted only
0.35 per cent of its gross domestic product
(GDP) to international cooperation, while the
United Nations recommendation in this regard
is 0.7 per cent of GDP for industrialised coun-
tries.” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights 2000). Obviously, with 0.7 per cent
of GDP, Belgium – or even all high-income coun-
tries together – could never attain in the rest of
the world the same level of realisation of the
right to health as at home; thus the Committee
did not support the egalitarian interpretation of
article 2(1). But if the other interpretation were
correct – the one according to which states nee-
ding assistance have an obligation to seek as-
sistance, while states that can provide assis-
tance do not really have any obligation to do so
– the 0.7 per cent recommendation was based
on no substantial legal argument.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultu-
ral Rights does not only issue ‘concluding obser-
vations’ as explained above, but also writes
‘general comments’ on issues arising from the
Covenant, which are somewhat authoritative in-
terpretations. One of the first such comments –
General Comment 3, issued in 1990 – was
about “the nature of States parties’ obligations”.
There I found this: “The Committee notes that
the phrase “to the maximum of its available re-
sources” was intended by the drafters of the Co-
venant to refer to both the resources existing
within a State and those available from the in-
ternational community through international co-
operation and assistance.” (Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights 1990). But
what does “those available from the international
community” mean: those that happen to be avai-
lable because of decisions voluntarily made by
some wealthier states, or those that should be
available because of legal obligations? This was
not particularly helpful.
More helpful, in my opinion, was the comment –
still in General Comment 3 of 1990 – about core
obligations: “the Committee is of the view that a
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minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfac-
tion of, at the very least, minimum essential le-
vels of each of the rights is incumbent upon
every State party”. This idea was further deve-
loped in subsequent general comments, inclu-
ding in General Comment 14 of 2000 about the
right to health (Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights 2000). General Comment 14
affirmed once again the idea I disliked as a stu-
dent (and still dislike, by the way) – which is that
social human rights are ‘movable’ and depend
on the wealth of the state one happens to live in
– in paragraph 9: “The notion of “the highest at-
tainable standard of health” … takes into ac-
count both the individual’s biological and so-
cio-economic preconditions and a State’s avai-
lable resources.” So, bad luck if you live in a
poor country! But it also affirmed and described,
in paragraphs 43 and 44, core obligations and
“obligations of comparable priority”.
The idea is that every human right, even though
its full realisation depends on circumstances,
has a core content that cannot be made depen-
dent on circumstances, otherwise the right to
health itself would be meaningless. For exam-
ple, if in a particular country there are severe
tensions between two different ethnic groups,
the government could outlaw all public state-
ments accusing groups of having certain cha-
racteristics – statements like “all these people
are thieves” – and that could be an acceptable
limitation of the freedom of speech. Depending
on the circumstances, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide would even oblige governments to take
such measures. But if it were accepted that cir-
cumstances can justify criminalising any related
critique of the government – statements like “our
government is not dealing properly with theft” –
then the right itself becomes meaningless. 
There must be a core content of every human
right: if there is not, then human rights are not
really human rights but human privileges for
those living under the adequate circumstances.
And if there is a core content of every human
right, there are corresponding core obligations.
With regard to the right to food, the Committee
defined the core content of that right as “availa-
bility of food in a quantity and quality sufficient
to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free
from adverse substances, and acceptable within
a given culture” (Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights 1999); or in other words:
whatever it takes to avoid starvation. If food is a
human right, then every human being should at
least have access to enough food to avoid star-
vation. (We know that this is not a reality yet, but
there is a big difference between taking notice
of a reality and qualifying a reality as justifiable
because of circumstances. Even in the face of
widespread slavery, one could affirm freedom
from slavery as a human right.)
What would the core content of the right to
health look like? Analogical to the right to food
and avoiding starvation, the right to health could
include whatever it takes to avoid… avoidable
serious disease or death. That may have been
the approach used by the Committee on Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights (2000: 13) when
it described the core obligations arising from the
right to health:
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facili-
ties, goods and services on a non-discriminatory
basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised
groups;
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential
food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to
ensure freedom from hunger to everyone;
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing
and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe
and potable water;
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to
time defined under the WHO Action Programme
on Essential Drugs;
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(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health
facilities, goods and services;
(f) To adopt and implement a national public
health strategy and plan of action, on the basis
of epidemiological evidence, addressing the
health concerns of the whole population;
…
Each of these core obligations would, if unfulfil-
led, lead to avoidable serious disease or death.
Of course, even if or where these obligations are
fulfilled, people will still become sick and die, but
the core obligations are about addressing the re-
latively easily avoidable causes of disease or
death: providing water, food, sanitation, and pri-
mary health care. One could argue that accor-
ding to these criteria, even the most expensive
medicine or medical intervention that is life
saving for a very limited number of people only
is to be considered as being included in the core
content of the right to health. But the reference
to “essential drugs, as from time to time defined
under the WHO Action Programme on Essential
Drugs” cleverly avoids the problem, as the World
Health Organization (WHO) provides a regularly
updated ‘model list’, considering “minimum me-
dicine needs for a basic health_care system, lis-
ting the most efficacious, safe and cost_effective
medicines for priority conditions” (World Health
Organization 2012).
Back in 2001, when the Declaration of Commit-
ment on HIV/AIDS mentioned that “access to
medication” is one of the fundamental elements
of the right to health, the medication needed to
treat AIDS still wasn’t on the WHO Model List of
Essential Medicines – it was included in 2002
(World Health Organization 2002), and MSF
played an important role in making that happen.
So when I received the Declaration of Commit-
ment on HIV/AIDS in October 2001, I already
knew that these medicines would be included in
the Model List, and that access to these medici-
nes would therefore be part of the core content
of the right to health. By then, the cost had drop-
ped to $ 365 per patient per year – in countries
like Mozambique where generic versions were
allowed, that was. But that still didn’t fit into the
budget of the Ministry of Health, which was
about US$ 10 per inhabitant per year. Not
everyone in Mozambique needed AIDS treat-
ment. Given the adult HIV prevalence rate esti-
mated at 15 per cent, we estimated that up to 30
per cent of the population would need AIDS
treatment. (When you start providing effective
AIDS treatment, HIV prevalence goes up simply
because many HIV positive people who would
have died no longer do.) Assuming that the cost
of basic AIDS treatment would go down to US$
100 per patient per year in the long run – which
did happen – we still needed a budget of US$
30 per inhabitant per year. Human right or not,
core obligation or not, the Government of Mo-
zambique could not afford it. But in its General
Comment 14 of 2000 about the right to health,
the Committee also clarified, in paragraph 45,
that “it is particularly incumbent on States parties
and other actors in a position to assist, to pro-
vide “international assistance and cooperation,
especially economic and technical” which en-
able developing countries to fulfil their core and
other obligations.” That made sense: a core con-
tent of the right to health, to which all human
beings are entitled, and for which all human
beings should support each other – through na-
tional and international solidarity.
And that meant that international assistance as
we know it – essentially charity – is not good
enough. We need reliable financial transfers wit-
hin countries and between countries.
Although I wrote an opinion paper for a Belgian
newspaper about the right to health and how it
would lead to global social protection in Decem-
ber 2001, it took me until December 2006 before
I wrote it as an academic paper, with Katharine
Derderian and David Melody (Ooms et al. 2006).
This argument became the cornerstone of my
doctoral thesis (Ooms 2008), and, with Rachel
Hammonds (Ooms &, Hammonds 2010), we
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used it in an article taking up a challenge laun-
ched by Norman Daniels – who reasoned along
the lines of the content of the right to health
being limited by the resources available at the
national level, but who, at the same time, judged
“Strongly Statist Versions of Relational Justice”
to be deeply unsatisfactory (Daniels N 2008).
When I finalised my doctoral thesis, the interpre-
tation according to which states have obligations
to provide assistance to other states – or to
people living in other states – was still quite con-
troversial. But in September 2011, at a gathering
convened by Maastricht University and the In-
ternational Commission of Jurists, a group of ex-
perts in international law and human rights
adopted the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterri-
torial Obligations of States in the area of Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights’. These prin-
ciples confirm the existence of an obligation to
provide international assistance, as part of a
wider obligation of international cooperation
(Group of experts 2011). As one of the members
of that group, I felt as if we had competed a new
logic that had started with General Comment 14
about the right to health of 2000, and that had
become a reality with the Declaration of Com-
mitment on HIV/AIDS of 2001 – a reality only for
HIV/AIDS, however. The Global Fund to fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was (and still
is), in my opinion, the embryonic version of a
global social protection scheme. To implement
the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Ob-
ligations a much more solid and wider global so-
cial protection scheme would be needed –
building on the Global Fund, or something else.
additional half argument: global social pro-
tection for health is a matter of global social
justice
During my third year as executive director of
MSF Belgium, in 2006, I started writing about
the humanitarian and human rights arguments
that are explained above. Professor Marleen
Temmerman of the University of Ghent – a friend
of our family who had helped my wife deliver
both of our children – encouraged me to work
on a doctoral thesis. I was not exactly bored in
my job, but a bit frustrated – it felt as if I was
creating an environment for everyone else to be
innovative and creative, while not having time
left to do any creative thinking myself. So I ac-
cepted Marleen’s challenge, and obtained my
‘Doctor of Philosophy’ title in 2008.
One of the chapters that did not make it into my
final thesis was about global justice. In 2003,
James Orbinski, the former international presi-
dent of MSF (who accepted the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1999), had introduced me to Thomas
Pogge – to the philosopher and to his thinking.
Pogge’s arguments seemed very close to the
ones I was working on, but on a deeper level.
When the time came to finalise my thesis, I had
still not mastered the philosophical arguments
well enough and left that chapter out.
In 2009, Pogge invited me to be the ‘Global Jus-
tice Fellow’ at the Whitney and Betty MacMillan
Center for International and Area Studies at
Yale, for the 2009-2010 year – an opportunity I
could not refuse. Pogge’s arguments are influ-
enced by John Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ and
Rawls’ ideas about ‘distributive justice’ in parti-
cular, but Rawls himself had rejected the appli-
cation of his theory at the international level
suggested by Pogge. That reminded me of the
paradoxical attitude (in my opinion) of many
people involved in international assistance who
seem to feel that solidarity within a country is
something good while solidarity across borders
is deeply problematic or even wrong. So this
was a good opportunity to try and understand
Rawls, and indirectly all those people who – with
the best of intentions – argue against internatio-
nal solidarity in the long run.
On my arrival at Yale, Pogge asked me why I be-
lieved that health is a human right, and what that
meant. My answer, as a lawyer, was simple:
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health is a human right because there are hu-
man rights treaties in which health is mentioned
as a human right, and what that means is men-
tioned – to some extent at least – in the treaties
too. “So,” I remember Pogge asking, “before the
treaties were signed, health was not a human
right?” After a year of chewing on that bone, I
came up with two answers. Both of them were
inspired by Rawls. Rawls became famous for his
thought experiment known as ‘the veil of igno-
rance’. It was intended to illustrate a way to iden-
tify “the principles that free and rational persons
concerned to further their own interest would ac-
cept in an initial position of equality as defining
the fundamental terms of their association”
(Rawls 1999: 10.) – if you can find the principles
these people would have adopted when desig-
ning their ideal society without knowing which
positions of this society they would occupy, i.e.
from behind ‘a veil of ignorance’, then you have
the principles of a just society. In itself, this
thought experiment never really convinced me,
I must admit. But it is essentially a metaphor that
unites several other concepts of justice, of which
two are particularly enlightening, in my opinion.
The first is about justice as fair and therefore sta-
ble cooperation. Simply put: a society should try
to be a fair system of cooperation (Rawls 2005:
11); if the terms of cooperation are felt to be un-
just by many participants, the cooperation will
not work efficiently. So if a society is just it will
be an efficient cooperation, and if it is not an ef-
ficient cooperation, it probably isn’t just – a bit
like the proof of the pudding being in the eating. 
The second is about justice as doing no harm to
each other – the idea at the core of Pogge’s
work, which Rawls may have rejected as too
simplistic, but which shines through the cracks
of his more sophisticated arguments. For exam-
ple, when Rawls argues that “background insti-
tutions of justice must work to keep property and
wealth evenly enough shared over time to pre-
serve the fair value of the political liberties and
fair equality of opportunity over generations”
(Rawls 2003: 51), he is essentially arguing that
wealth being distributed ‘too unevenly’ is a threat
to equality of opportunity. Those who have too
much wealth are harming others. Branko Mila-
novic, calls this ‘bad inequality’ or inequality that
“provides the means to preserve acquired posi-
tions”, as opposed to ‘good inequality’ or inequa-
lity that “is needed to create incentives for
people to study, work hard, or start risky entre-
preneurial projects” (Milanovic 2005: 12).
My first answer to Pogge was about justice as
fair and stable cooperation, and inspired by the
science of natural evolution – I prefer not to use
the expression evolutionary theory. The science
of natural evolution explains why human beings
are inclined to observe limitations when they
harm each other for their own interests, like
fighting for food, and are also inclined to support
the other who needs support to remain a valid
member of the group. These are inclinations that
allow the individual to thrive within a cooperative
group. Readers who are familiar with the sci-
ence of natural evolution may think I succumbed
to the theory of ‘group selection’ – according to
which certain inclinations or physical qualities
spread because they make the group that has
them fitter – and abandoned the more orthodox
theory of ‘gene selection’ – according to which
such inclinations and physical qualities are atta-
ched to genes, and genes only spread if they
make their individual possessors fitter. But let
me reassure them; I am a rather strict adept of
gene selection. However, I think that ‘kin selec-
tion’ is a form of gene selection: genes spread if
they make their possessors fitter, but that also
happens if the behaviour of one possessor of a
particular gene promotes the chances of survival
and procreation of his or her sisters and bro-
thers, who have about 50 per cent chances of
possessing the same gene. A cluster of genes
imposing inclinations to support each other and
to observe limitations when harming each other
could have been quite successful within a rela-
tively small tribe of hunters and gatherers of
which most members were cousins, if not sib-
lings. A cluster of genes imposing exactly the
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same inclinations, but only under a condition of
reciprocity, would have been even more suc-
cessful. And that reciprocity would mean that the
occasional intruder not possessing these genes
would not be able to exploit the cooperative in-
clinations of most members of the tribe.
Human rights, then, can be understood as trans-
lations of these genetic inclinations: when small
nomadic tribes became settlements, settlements
became cities, and cities became states, these
inclinations needed to be formalised and codi-
fied. Instead of prescribing decent cooperative
behaviour between individuals, human rights
describe minimum standards of behaviour of
networks of cooperation – societies – towards
individuals. If human rights are still – according
to the treaties – predominantly about what your
government cannot do to you, or what it must do
for you, it is because countries are still perceived
as the main networks of cooperation. As long as
governments of countries guarantee human
rights to all inhabitants, it means that all coope-
ration happens according to minimum stan-
dards. The stronger person cannot enslave the
weaker, as the government would interfere. The
stronger person cannot use violence against the
weaker, as a monopoly of violence has been
given to the government, and the government
most ensure fair trials before using violence. The
stronger person can try to exploit the weaker,
but the stronger will have to pay taxes that will
provide food, healthcare and education to
everyone, and so there are limits to the exploi-
tation that can happen.
But the reality of countries being the main net-
works of cooperation is changing, rapidly. From
the perspective of a small grower of coffee
beans in Kenya, the main network of coopera-
tion is not Kenya, not the People of Kenya nor
the Government of Kenya, but the global coffee
market. The traders, the buyers, and the consu-
mers of coffee are the members of the ‘global
coffee tribe’. They ‘cooperate’, but have no in-
stitutions to make sure that the conditions of co-
operation live up to minimum standards of de-
cency. Each member of the global coffee tribe
negotiates for the highest possible profits or be-
nefits, often without realising that as a result of
this uncorrected cooperation, many coffee gro-
wers cannot afford to take their children to a he-
alth centre when needed.
This kind of uncontrolled cooperation that cau-
ses huge profits for some and inhumanely low
living conditions for others goes against the na-
tural inclinations and expectations of the people
who are losing out. They may accept uneven
distribution of the products of cooperation, but
not a distribution that is so extremely uneven
that they are unable to feed their children. If they
‘accept’ the present situation, it is because they
have no other choice, and that creates a very
unstable basis for cooperation in other areas
where the winners of global trade may be in a
more vulnerable position. That is what I tried to
explain in ‘Why the West Is Perceived as Being
Unworthy of Cooperation’ (Ooms 2010). If we
want to have smooth cooperation at the global
level, we will have to make sure that everyone
involved in it will benefit from it, accepting une-
ven distribution only within limits. As we do not
always realise how very innocent choices – like
going to one coffee shop because it is a bit
cheaper than the next one – encourage the glo-
bal market dynamics that lead to extremely une-
ven distribution of the products of cooperation,
we need global social protection to correct those
dynamics.
My second answer to Pogge was about justice
as doing no harm to each other. Reading Rawls
about “background institutions of justice” that
“must work to keep property and wealth evenly
enough shared over time to preserve the fair
value of the political liberties and fair equality of
opportunity over generations” (Rawls 2003: 51),
reminded me about a phenomenon that Gunnar
Myrdal had identified a few decades earlier, and
called ‘cumulative causation’. Centres of econo-
mic growth, like families, clans, cities, or even
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countries, invest their profits in additional com-
petitive advantages and becoming even stron-
ger, while the periphery of these centres under-
goes a ‘backwash effect’ and becomes even
weaker (Myrdal 1957: 12). To illustrate that his
theory of cumulative causation really is common
sense, Myrdal referred to Matthew’s Gospel:
“For to the one who has, more will be given, and
he will have an abundance, but from the one
who has not, even what he has will be taken
away” (Matthew 13:12). Later, the phenomenon
became known as the ‘Matthew effect’ in econo-
mics (Rigney 2010). As mentioned above, Mila-
novic (2005: 12) calls the problem ‘bad in-
equality’ or inequality that “provides the means
to preserve acquired positions”, as opposed to
‘good inequality’ or inequality that “is needed to
create incentives for people to study, work hard,
or start risky entrepreneurial projects.”
For the sake of simplicity, allow me to use ‘bad
inequality’ as a generic expression that captures
Myrdal’s ‘backwash effect’ and the problem that
Rawls described when arguing for ‘background
institutions for justice’: that if property and wealth
are not evenly enough shared over time, the
value of the political liberties and fair equality of
opportunity are jeopardised. Now, is bad inequa-
lity a form of doing harm – i.e. harm done by
those who have the means to preserve their pri-
vileged positions, who use these means, and
who by using these means fix others in their un-
derprivileged positions? One can argue that as
long as the people enjoying privileged positions
have no intention to keep the others down, they
are not causing harm: it is the situation that cau-
ses harm. But one can also argue that if people
enjoying privileged positions understand ‘bad
inequality’ and how it works, they should either
change the situation or abandon their privileged
positions. An intellectual middle ground could be
to consider social protection as a kind of insu-
rance against unintended, unidentifiable and un-
foreseeable harm-doing. Whenever we partici-
pate in cooperation, we do not really know if the
uneven distribution of the products of coopera-
tion will be the consequence of uneven effort or
the consequence of uneven prior positions. To
be sure that we do no harm, we accept that a
share of the products of cooperation be redistri-
buted in accordance with needs, and that all
people keep certain freedoms, regardless of
their poverty or wealth.
If ‘bad inequality’ is a real problem, then we
should wonder if it remains confined within the
borders of countries. Because of the nature of
the problem, we really have no reason to believe
it would remain confined within countries’ bor-
ders, and therefore we need global social pro-
tection, as Hammonds and I argue in a chapter
of a still unpublished book (Ooms & Hammonds
forthcoming).
All in all, this probably isn’t an additional argu-
ment, but it is a foundation for my second argu-
ment. Health is a human right, and at least for
its core content, the corresponding duties fall on
humanity. That is what justice requires, and we
need global social protection to implement it.
third argument: global social protection is a
matter of enlightened self-interest, to avoid a
‘tragedy of the commons’
Trying to answer Pogge brought me to read Myr-
dal’s works again, and it brought me back to
Myrdal’s prediction that global economic integra-
tion would be bad for poorer countries: “On the
international as on the national level trade does
not by itself necessarily work for equality. It may,
on the contrary, have strong backwash effects
on the underdeveloped countries” (Myrdal 1957:
51-52). But Myrdal’s predication was not entirely
right. Until the end of the 20th century, global ine-
quality evolved as Myrdal had predicted; rich
countries became richer, and poor countries be-
came poorer. Inequality between countries –
measured by comparing the average income of
each country (and ignoring the differences in in-
come between people living in the same coun-
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try) – rose. By the end of the 20th century, how-
ever, this trend reversed; inequality between
countries has been falling ever since. According
to Glenn Firebaugh (2003: xi) “income inequality
across nations peaked in the last third of the
twentieth century and is now declining”, how-
ever, “[a]t the same time, inequality within nati-
ons – which had been declining over the first half
of the twentieth century – has begun to rise”.
What is going on here? In 1997, Dani Rodrik
(1997: 69) warned against “social disintegration
as the price of economic integration”. In a later
book he argued: “Governments today actively
compete with each other by pursuing policies
they believe will earn them market confidence
and attract trade and capital inflows…” (Rodrik
2007: 201). Vic George and Paul Wilding argue
along the same lines: “Concern about competi-
tiveness has obviously put social security sche-
mes under pressure given the way in which the
debate about competitiveness has focused pri-
marily on employment costs and levels of social
benefits and taxation and the supposed damage
they can do to competitiveness” (George & Wil-
ding 2002: 70).
Most research about the consequences of the
quest for competitiveness on social policy has
focused on wealthier countries – countries with
rather generous social protection mechanisms
that are now under pressure. There is evidence,
however, that poorer countries, while trying to
establish their social protection, are hampered
by the very same quest for competitiveness (Avi-
Yonah 2001). The same author concludes: “it
can be argued that given the need for tax reve-
nues, developing countries would in general pre-
fer to refrain from granting tax incentives, if only
they could be assured that no other developing
country would be able to grant such incentives”
(ibid.).
If correct, than social protection has many fea-
tures of a common-pool resource, and it may be
argued that it is becoming the victim of a parti-
cular kind of ‘tragedy of the commons’: not over-
exploitation but under-exploitation is the pro-
blem. By under-exploiting the potential for taxa-
tion and social protection, countries try to attract
economic activity from other countries, which
decreases these other countries’ ability to raise
taxes. The solution to a tragedy of the commons
is regulation or self-regulation, and that is preci-
sely what Pierre Pestieau (2005: 10) proposes:
“[t]he only way to reverse such an expected out-
come is to rely on cooperation between national
governments”.
What should this cooperation include? Some-
how, it should oblige all countries to adopt cer-
tain minimum levels of social protection – and
therefore minimum levels of taxation. When we-
althier countries’ governments will try to propose
that, it seems inevitable that poorer countries’
governments will argue that this is merely an at-
tempt to end a recent trend – a trend of poorer
countries capturing a bigger share of the global
economy. Richer countries’ governments could
reply that minimum levels of social protection
are required because of human rights, while
poorer countries’ governments could reply that,
in this case, international assistance is required
because of human rights, too.
This would lead to a global social protection re-
gime, including a global social protection floor –
minimum levels of social protection to be obser-
ved by all countries – and a global social pro-
tection fund, to channel transfers from richer to
poorer countries. A global social protection re-
gime would serve the interests of the common
people of all countries. The common people of
poorer countries would benefit from more reli-
able international assistance, and from the dam-
pening of tax competition. The common people
of wealthier countries would benefit from the
dampening of tax competition. These arguments
are being elaborated in a paper written with
many others, to be published in 2013 (Ooms et
al. forthcoming).
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conclusion
The more I think and write about it, the more it
seems obvious: global social protection is the
inevitable next step in a natural evolution that
started when individual members of tribes of
hunting and gathering humans understood they
had to respect and support each other. The 20th-
century translation of that understanding is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its
two International Covenants, both focusing on
duties of national governments towards the
people under their jurisdiction. The 21st-century
translation of that understanding will be a clarifi-
cation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and its two International Covenants with
regards to ‘extraterritorial obligations’ or, in other
words, a clarification of the duties of humanity
towards humanity. This is already taking shape
in the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial
Obligations of States in the area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights’ (Group of Experts
2011), and, in the area of civil and political
human rights, in the concept of the ‘Responsibi-
lity to Protect’ (International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty 2001).
All in all, my three and a half arguments are, es-
sentially, a single argument. The idea of autono-
mous, self-containing and sovereign states has
become an anachronism. The reality of the 21st
century is that people are members of a global
society. And therefore, they have humanitarian
duties towards each other (across borders); they
have duties of justice to support the realisation
of each other’s human rights (across borders);
and they serve their own interests by supporting
the realisation of each other’s human rights
(across borders).
In hindsight, the step from supporting Doctors
Without Borders to supporting Social Protection
Across Borders is only an incremental one. Let’s
take it.
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